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Populism as an Expression 
of Political Communication 
Content and Style: A New 
Perspective
Claes H. de Vreese1, Frank Esser2, Toril Aalberg3, 
Carsten Reinemann4, and James Stanyer5
Abstract
In this article, the introduction to a special International Journal of Press/Politics (IJPP) 
issue on populism, we articulate and define populism as a communication phenomenon. 
We provide an overview of populist political communication research and its current 
foci. We offer a framework for ongoing research and set the boundary conditions 
for a new generation of research on populist political communication, with an aim 
to push the research agendas and design toward a more interactive, systematic, and 
in particular, comparative approach to the study of populist political communication.
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Introduction
About fifty years ago, in 1967, a conference was held at the London School of 
Economics on the meaning and characteristics of populism. The opening of the confer-
ence publication (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 1, cited in Moffitt 2016) concluded, “[T]
here can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is clear 
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what it is.” Five decades later and scholars have identified several aspects of populism 
that are analytically useful. Studies have shown the configuration and nature of popu-
lism in places like Hungary, Italy, Spain, France, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Australia, and South Africa. Recent elections in 2016/2017/2018, including those in 
Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, France, India, Italy, Austria, and Norway 
remind us that populism today is a truly global phenomenon.
The electoral success of populist parties has increased over the past decades. The 
mean vote share for “populist right” parties doubled from less than 7 percent in the 
1960s to almost 14 percent in the 2010s. On the left, populist party support went from 
less than 3 percent to almost 13 percent in the same period (Inglehart and Norris 2017: 
23). From this perspective, the increase in the support for populism is unequivocal. 
The reasons for this are complex, but two broadly held interpretations point toward 
economic insecurity on the one hand and cultural backlash on the other (see also 
Mudde 2007; van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018).
In the past decade, exogenous events and “external conditions” have been condu-
cive to both: A significant part of the world went through the longest economic 
recession and crisis in a century. To this can be added transnational migrant flows 
and growing income inequalities, which economists have forcefully demonstrated 
both within and between countries (see also Fraser Institute 2017). Laclau (2005) 
considers such crises at the very root of populism, both historically and contempo-
rarily. In this vein, Otjes et al. (2018) show how certain populist political parties 
presented a “unified nativist” response to the economic crisis. Indeed, Kübler and 
Kriesi (2017) note that globalization, which captures many of these trends, provides 
fertile ground for populism. In sum, the conditions for an even further populist surge 
are, thus, present.
Is populism per se a positive force for change or a threat to democracy? Populism 
might increase representation and give a voice to groups of citizens that do not feel 
heard by the current political elite. Populism might broaden the attention for issues 
that are not in the mainstream news. Populism might mobilize groups of people that 
have felt on the fringe of the political system. Populism might improve the responsive-
ness of the political system by making actors and parties align their policies more with 
the “wishes of the people.” Populism might be a refreshing wakeup call to power-
holders, prompting periodic reflections on their conduct and elitism. That said, popu-
lism might also challenge or have outright negative consequences for liberal democracy 
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Populism might curb minority rights. Populism can use 
an electoral mandate to erode independent institutions that are considered corner 
stones of liberal democracies like the courts or the free media. Populism might lead to 
political tribalism, which impedes civil discourse and disencourages political 
compromise.
Most scholars tend to refrain from offering an absolute condemnation or celebra-
tion but, instead, dissect the different elements and expressions of populism and con-
sider them in an appropriate contextual fashion. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) 
subscribe to this position and see populism as both a threat and a corrective for demo-
cratic politics. In countries with a consensual, parliamentary system; strong 
de Vreese et al. 425
institutions of checks and balances; and a strong, autonomous, and publicly respected 
press, populism is much less likely to become an existential threat. In countries with a 
polarized majority voting system, weak institutions of checks and balances, and a 
weak press (subject to instrumentalization attempts and other attacks on their indepen-
dence), however, the picture is different.  In this Introduction, however, we are not so 
much concerned with a normative assessment of opportunity structures and challenges 
to democracy as with an improved understanding of the role of political communica-
tion in the process.
The starting point of our reflections is the recognition that populist ideas must be 
communicated discursively to achieve the communicator’s goals and the intended 
effects on the audience. We follow an approach that combines Mudde’s (2004) ide-
ology-centered and Hawkin’s (2010) discourse-centered understanding of populism. 
Accordingly, populism can be understood as a discursive manifestation of a thin-
centered ideology that is not only focused on the underlying “set of basic assump-
tions about the world” but in particular on “the language that unwittingly expresses 
them” (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012: 3). Put differently, the communicative 
tools used for spreading populist ideas are just as central as the populist ideas them-
selves. The growing realization among political scientists that the discourse is of 
crucial importance for the understanding of populism (Aslanidis 2016; Jagers and 
Walgrave 2007; Laclau 2005; Moffitt 2016; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014) is 
taken up by the contributors to this Special Issue from the perspective of communi-
cation science. The articles gathered here are examples of a new generation of popu-
lism researchers. With this Introduction—made available to the authors in the early 
phase of the peer review process—we provide a conceptual basis for an understand-
ing of populism as an expression of political communication content and political 
communication style.
Populism as a Communication Phenomenon
Conceiving populism as an ideology that is articulated discursively by political actors 
and media actors bridges existing literature from political science and communication 
science. From a distinct political communication point of view, the focus now shifts 
from what constitutes the ideology of populism to how it is communicated. From this 
communication-centered perspective, the emphasis is on populist messages as inde-
pendent “phenomenon as such” and no longer on a particular party family or type of 
politician. With populism “as content,” we refer to the public communication of core 
components of populist ideology (such as people-centrism and anti-elitism) with a 
characteristic set of key messages or frames. With populism “as style,” we refer to the 
fact that these messages expressing populist ideology are often associated with the use 
of a characteristic set of presentational style elements. In this perspective, populism is 
understood as features of political communication rather than characteristics of the 
actor sending the message. Hence, the focus is on the unique contribution of commu-
nication processes to “construct” populist ideas, and at the communicative styles that 
systematically co-occur with it. Our understanding of, and approach to, populism, 
426 The International Journal of Press/Politics 23(4) 
thus, centers around communication. We believe this offers a grounding definition of 
populism that is nuanced, concise about its constituent elements, and resonates theo-
retically with a more or less explicit popular use of the term.
By considering populism a communication phenomenon that can be operational-
ized by the frequent or infrequent use of characteristic content and style features, it 
becomes possible to determine degrees of populism. This makes it a gradual concept 
where the question of who is populist will be answered by empirical measures of an 
actor’s communicative output. The equivalent logic can be applied to the audience 
side where the relative strength of corresponding attitudes decides who is a populist 
and who is not.
Depending on the use of characteristic content and style features, one can distin-
guish different types of populism (Aalberg et al. 2017; Jagers and Walgrave 2007): 
Complete populism includes reference and appeals to the people, anti-elitism, and 
exclusion of out-groups. Excluding populism includes only references and appeals to 
the people and exclusion of out-groups, whereas anti-elitist populism includes refer-
ence and appeals to the people and anti-elitism. Finally, empty populism includes only 
reference and appeals to the people.
At the very core of this definition, you find communication and the media. How do 
voters make sense of politics? Given the centrality of the media as the key connector 
between political actors and the public, it is astonishing so little academic attention has 
been devoted to the intersection between media and populism. Much effort, in particu-
lar in political science, has gone into understanding why populist parties have gained 
electoral success. However, communication—a key element of this phenomenon—has 
mostly been overlooked. Even in the new Oxford Handbook of Populism, none of the 
chapters focuses on the effect of populist messages on citizens, and only one entry 
looks at populism and the media (Kaltwasser et al. 2017). In fact, systematic knowl-
edge is sparse not only related to the role of the media but also on questions dealing 
with populist actors as communicators, and the impact of populist communication 
strategies on citizens (Aalberg et al. 2017). Moffitt (2016: 94) succinctly concludes 
that “media can no longer be treated as a ‘side issue’ when it comes to understanding 
contemporary populism. It must be put at the centre of our analysis . . . .” We could not 
agree more.
Below, we outline how communication needs to be considered both at the levels of 
political actors and parties, the media themselves, and citizens. It is important to stress, 
however, that for each of these central actors, ongoing developments shape the capac-
ity, velocity, and meaning of their communication and expressions. Today’s political 
communication ecology is characterized by a hybrid, high choice media environment 
in which politics, media, technology, and citizens are all changing (van Aelst et al. 
2017). To highlight a few key developments, we are experiencing a proliferation of 
news and information sources; an alteration of information formats; a convergence 
between mass and interpersonal communication; new alignments between consumer/
citizen preferences and media use; and changing news consumption patterns with a 
simultaneous development toward both active, self-selected versus pre-determined, 
algorithmic information seeking and selection (see, for example, Shah et al. 2017; 
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Stroud 2008; Zuiderveen Borghesius et al. 2016). Particularly worrisome in this con-
text is the risk of increasing relativism in which factual information comes to be seen 
as a matter of opinion, evidence is neglected, and conspiracy theories thrive (Van Aelst 
et al. 2017). The current “disinformation” debate is a tribute to the prevalence of 
relativism.
Ceteris paribus, the proliferation of new media is conducive for populist communi-
cation. Empirical examples in recent years have demonstrated this in Switzerland 
(Ernst, Engesser and Esser 2017), the Netherlands (Hameleers, Bos and de Vreese 
2016), Hungary, and Italy (Moffitt 2016). These studies stress the affordances and 
opportunities of new and social media as successful venues and platforms for populist 
political actors. As Keane (2013) succinctly put it, “populism is particularly suited to 
the contours of the ‘new media galaxy.’” The weaknesses of extant political-commu-
nication-centered approaches in the study of populism lie in a lack of systematic and 
comprehensive data, lack of cross-national evidence, and lack of clarity about the role 
of old/new/hybrid media. It is in recognition of this lacunae that we position this spe-
cial issue: There is a strong need for a populist communication perspective, and there 
is a strong need for a comparative, systematic, and comprehensive perspective that 
takes us beyond the particularity of case studies.
Communication Matters
If we take the premise seriously that populism is a communication phenomenon, we 
can distinguish how three key actors—(1) political parties, (2) the media, and (3) 
citizens—relate to populism in their communication (see also Aalberg and de 
Vreese 2017). With populism as an expression of political communication content 
and style, we zoom in on the functions and expressions that come into play when 
crafting and distributing messages, the fora in which these appear, and their poten-
tial effects.
Political Actors
In populist communication that manifests itself in discourse, three elements are cen-
tral: (1) reference to “the People,” (2) a battle against the “corrupt” elite, and with a 
possible extension of (3) the identification of an out-group. These defining elements 
have been emphasized by several scholars of populism (Aalberg et al. 2017; Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007; Kriesi 2014; Mudde 2004). The reference to the people is the first 
defining feature. It is at the very core, the minimal defining element, also dubbed the 
“empty populism” (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). People can take different meanings; 
this discursive vagueness allows populists to unite diverse audiences under one label. 
By appealing to the people, populists “are attempting to bring a subject called ‘the 
people’ into being: They produce what they claim to present” (Moffit and Tormey 
2014: 389; see also Laclau 2005). The construction of an elite in opposition to the 
interests of the people is the second defining feature. It refers to communication that 
explicitly condemns the establishment, the current power-holders, the incumbents and 
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proponents of the existing, malfunctioning system. This anti-elitism populism is rheto-
ric used in particular by outsiders, political actors who are trying to gain leverage in a 
political system and build up name recognition. The third defining feature includes 
reference and appeals to the people, and the exclusion of out-groups (excluding popu-
lism). A political communication perspective holds that constructing a specific sense 
of social identity is at the heart of populism. Communicative messages can prime 
aspects of social identity, define in-groups (the good people), and construct out-groups 
(problematic minorities, self-serving elites, scapegoats presented as threats). The iden-
tification of a clear out-group is not a defining feature of all kinds of populism, but 
out-group rhetoric is often used by populists on the left (against capitalists) and on the 
right (against immigrants).
A useful distinction is made between research that looks at political actors, a priori 
defined as populists, and investigates “factors that might explain their presence and 
clout as well as their communication strategies, tactics, and styles” (Stanyer et al. 
2016). Another approach takes a starting point in key characteristics of populist com-
munication and then analyzes the extent to which different actors make use of these, 
without an a priori classification of who is a populist or not. The specific communica-
tion of political actors may come in different forms. Earlier work has focused on 
speeches, rallies, manifestos, and campaign advertising (e.g., Bos et al. 2011; Rooduijn 
and Akkerman 2017; Schmuck and Matthes 2017). The relationship of populist politi-
cal communicators with the media has traditionally been strained. On one hand, popu-
list actors need the “oxygen of publicity,” which is often supplied by the (mass) media. 
On the other hand, populist actors often receive critical coverage in the “elite media” 
and favorable coverage in the popular press (Mazzoleni et al. 2003). At the same time, 
it has become evident that (legacy) media are often portrayed by the very same politi-
cal actors as “corrupt” elite institutions, fitting into the above definition of anti-elitism. 
A recent example of this is U.S. President Trump’s attack on mainstream news media 
as “fake” and speculating about limiting their freedom and operations (Amanpour 
2016; Dawes 2016). To use his own words on twitter, “The FAKE NEWS media (fail-
ing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the 
enemy of the American People!” (@realDonaldTrump 1:48 p.m.; February 17, 2017).
With the increasing popularity of social media, both as platforms for sharing news 
and as a communication ecology of their own, recent research has looked explicitly at 
populism communication in these areas. Engesser et al. (2017) concluded that the abil-
ity to communicate to and with “the people” in a direct manner while bypassing main-
stream media has made social media popular with populist politicians. Social media 
provide direct access to the public without journalistic interference (but subject to new 
forms of algorithmic gatekeeping), offer the possibility of establishing a close and 
direct connection to the people, foster the potential for personalized forms of commu-
nication, and can create a feeling of community, belonging, and recognition among 
otherwise scattered groups. Across six Western democracies, Ernst et al. (2017) found 
that social media populism is most often used by those parties that are at the extreme 
left or extreme right of the political spectrum, or those holding an opposition or chal-
lenger status.
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The Media
As a second actor, the media are key to analyze and understand. Populism research 
traditionally paid little attention or only lip service to the centrality of the media. This 
is changing. A useful distinction can be made by considering populism by the media or 
through the media (Esser et al. 2017). In the former, media organizations explicitly 
engage in their own kind of populism. This can be done by being pro-active advocates 
on behalf of the people, with a critical attitude toward power holders. To some degree, 
this coincides with journalistic norms and role conceptions (such as representing the 
“man in the street” and being the fourth estate, controlling and holding power account-
able). However, in an exacerbated and activist form, this would build on some of the 
same principles as populist communication by some political actors.
In the latter, populism through the media, the attention is less on the media as actors 
themselves and more on the contents they carry. By providing a forum for actors using 
populist communication, the media help disseminate these messages and increase the 
visibility and legitimacy of these actors. As Mazzoleni (2008: 50) phrases it, “the 
media, intentionally or not, may serve as powerful mobilization tools for populist 
causes.” Indeed, in a recent cross-national synthesis of extant research, it was con-
cluded that news coverage of populist actors has increased (Esser et al. 2017). 
Moreover, some issues (such as immigration) are closer aligned with populist actors, 
and the agenda of issues covered in the media should, therefore, also be part of consid-
ering populist media content (Reinemann et al. 2017). In some cases, it appears that 
political actors like Wilders in the Netherlands and Trump in the United States have 
been highly successful using social media, not only to bypass mainstream media but 
also, perhaps even more importantly, to set the agenda of mainstream media (see also 
Karpf 2017), thereby amplyfying the reach of their messages significantly and extend-
ing the duration of the impact of the message in the ongoing news cycle.
It remains an open question, however, whether some actors receive a disproportiate 
amount of coverage and some have raised the question whether the centrality of media 
coverage is unique to populist actors or a feature of politics more generally, applying 
to actors across the political spectrum (Bos et al. 2011). Regardless of the measureable 
effects of news reporting, the recent populist surge has sparked several rounds of self-
reflections on the side of the media and journalism in the wake of, for example, the 
Brexit referendum, the Trump U.S. Presidential election, and the 2017 German elec-
tion. These have led to disucssions of how to cover populist actors, how to represent 
the breadth of electoral preferences, and a revived discussion of the democratic role 
and responsiblities of journalism (e.g., Amanpour 2016; Carlson 2016; Dawes 2016; 
Lawrence and Boydstun 2017; Patterson 2016).
Beyond news media, social media and other digital platforms are increasingly 
important for how people find and access news and information and engage in politics 
and public life (Newman et al. 2017). As noted above, political actors have already 
embraced the opportunities these platforms offer, as have especially younger voters. 
The implications for different kinds of populism by or through media have not been 
subject to much reseach yet (though see, for example, Groshek and Koc-Michalska 
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2017) but will be an important topic as we move to an increasingly digital media 
environment.
Citizens
The third actor to look at is citizens. Extant approaches have focused extensively on 
election campaigns and the media’s impact on support for populist actors. In this con-
text, well-documented trends in national electorates—such as party-voter de-align-
ment and exposure via different media—might make citizens more susceptible to 
populist appeals. On one hand, citizens are actors in the communicative interactions 
by, for example, expressing themselves in reaction to news coverage (see also Esser 
et al. 2017) or by initiating or engaging with populist messages on social media plat-
form (see Shah et al. 2017 on expression effects more generally). Citizens are also 
consumers of media, and there is increasing attention to the selective mechanisms 
driving some individuals to certain types of news outlets, while neglecting others. 
There is some scattered evidence that citizens that vote for populist parties tend to 
prefer, for example, tabloid news outlets (the United Kingdom) or commercial news 
(Norway) (see Reinemann et al. 2017) and as such consume less news than voters for 
other parties (Bos et al. 2016).
On the other hand, citizens are also recipients of and audiences for populist mes-
sages from political actors and the media. However, as succinctly summarized by 
Reinemann et al. (2017: 382), up until recently, the study of populist communication 
effects was mostly a side note to studies of, in particular, right wing voting: “Most of 
the assumptions about who is affected, why they are affected and by what kinds of mes-
sage elements do not come from systematic studies.” In this current special issue, we do 
not prioritize expanding the knowledge base on why some citizens are more or less 
likely to vote for populist parties but rather on the effects of populist communication, 
one of the largest lacunae in extant research. Reinemann et al. (2017) offer a useful 
process model as a heuristic to think about and locate populist communication effects 
research, with room for attention to drivers of selection, effects of mediated and direct 
populist communication, different processes and effects, and moderators of these.
Finally, recent research has even explored whether some citizens are more likely to 
hold populist attitudes themselves, that is, whether they also conceive of the elite as 
corrupt, the people being under-represented, and certain out-groups being culprits 
(Hameleers 2017; Schulz et al. 2017).
Table 1 summarizes the different foci that populist communication research can 
have at the level of each of the three elements. As outlined above, much of our current 
knowledge in each of these areas is scattered and too often based on single case studies 
rather than comparative analyses.
While more research on each of the three core actors—political actors, media, and 
citizens—is encouraged, it seems particularly pertinent to advance our understanding 
of the interactions between one or more of them, preferably in a comparative perspec-
tive so as to leverage insights beyond the limitations of specific cases. Such questions 
might center around the interaction between political actors and the media: When are 
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some actors granted coverage and others not? Under which conditions can actors suc-
cessfully bypass the media? When do the media neglect or amplify political actors’ 
social media communication? In the interaction between political actors and citizens, 
we would need to know more about how political actors build up and maintain chan-
nels of communication with their sympathizers. In the media–citizen interaction, more 
attention is needed to separate out which of the constitutive elements of populist com-
munication have effects, and importantly on whom, and under what circumstances 
(Reinemann et al. 2017).
Conclusion
Our goal is to define populism as a communication phenomenon and set the boundary 
conditions for a new generation of research on this. It allows for easier empirical 
operationalization and more gradual measurement. As the contributions to this Special 
Issue demonstrate, a political communication perspective holds great potential for 
advancing populism research. In this sense, we believe that “not only including but 
focusing on the communicative aspects of populism will help us to better understand 
one of the hallmarks of contemporary politics” (Aalberg et al. 2017). The dissemina-
tion of populist communication and its widespread appeal can also not be fully under-
stood unless it is investigated in a comparative context. While populism has been 
found to be a global phenomenon common to most democratic countries (Kaltwasser 
et al. 2017), the form, visibility, and success of populism varies considerably across 
cultures. Many contextual factors determine the amount of populist communication 
adopted by political actors, media actors, and citizens. Only comparative analysis can 
reveal and explain similarities and differences in the communicative aspects of popu-
lism across countries.
The timeliness of the topic and the vitality of the research community were evident 
in the response to the open call for proposals for the Special Issue. We received 70+ 
submissions from across the globe. These were often comparative in nature and focused 
on political actors, the media, and/or citizens. A subset of papers was developed in full 
and presented at a conference of the COST Action “Populist Political Communication 
in Europe” (IS1308), which took place in Madrid in March 2018. Based on blind peer 
Table 1. Foci of Populist Communication Research.
Actor Foci
Political 
actors
References to the people, anti-elitism, and out-groups. 
Communication aimed at the media (indirect) or supporters 
(direct) via speeches, advertising, manifestos, or social media
Media Populism by the media (as “activist” organizations) and through 
the media (as platforms for populist actors)
Citizens Selection of populist media contents, expressions of populist 
attitudes, targets of populist messages
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review, the final selection of papers was made. The issue includes five articles. In the 
first article, Zulianello et al. (2018) analyze communication strategies of political lead-
ers on Facebook with evidence from multiple continents. In the second article, Bobba 
et al. (2018) focus on the potential gender gap by comparing user engagement with 
populist and nonpopulist Facebook pages in three countries. In the third article, 
Wettstein et al. (2018) analyze more than nine thousand news stories from ten coun-
tries, identifying distinct roles the media can assume in their coverage of populist 
actors. In the fourth article, Wirz et al. (2018) combine panel survey data with media 
content data in four European metropolitan areas showing how media coverage 
affects immigrant attitudes and negative emotions. In the final article, Hameleers 
et al. (2018) report on an unprecedented sixteen-country experiment testing the 
effects of populist communication on political engagement. Collectively, the spe-
cial issue launches a framework for a research agenda on populist communication 
and provides five empirical analyses focusing on political actors, media, and citi-
zens, and the interaction between these groups. The contributions are comparative 
in nature and go well beyond the single case study description to identify and 
explicate the drivers of patterns of communication and the conditionalities of 
effects.
Despite the significant gaps bridged in this Special Issue, providing a clear frame-
work for understanding populist political communication, providing comparative and 
systematic evidence, and advancing our theorizing, we still see considerable gaps for 
future populism research to fill. In pursuing this endeavor, we call for populism (com-
munication) research to consider the following moving forward:
•• Avoid treating some political actors as populists and others as not. The con-
struction and definition of the “people,” the articulation of the corrupt elite, and 
the choice of out-groups should be systematically analyzed. However, akin to 
the now established view that populism itself is not per se bad or good, if popu-
lism is in essence a communication phenomenon, we should treat it as a con-
tinuum, and analyze and assess the degree to which, and conditions under 
which, elements of populist communication are used;
•• Do not consider the media only as a platform for transmitting messages (i.e., 
not only populism through the media but also by the media). Do not just look at 
media content but also behind it. With new players in the field, ranging from 
Breitbart to Fox News, ownership structures, competition, and political affilia-
tions, driving coverage should become center stage, not an add-on in analyses 
of the media;
•• Do not look at social media platforms and populism in isolation. Look at social 
media platforms in context, as platforms of sharing, disseminating, emphasiz-
ing, escalating, and expressing views as part of a larger information system. At 
the same time, expand the focus of (populism) social media research beyond the 
current descriptive studies: Social media are conducive to populism, but we still 
know little about key features such as the use of visuals (e.g., political memes), 
the patterns of sharing and liking (and the degree to which this is automated or 
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troll-driven; see, for example, Howard et al. 2017), the extent to which social 
media offer personalized and tailored information, and the degree to which 
social media are platforms for sharing disinformation.
•• Do not only look at citizens’ partisan and ideologically driven selections of 
news and information. Ideological echo-chambers are important, but in a media 
and information landscape with an abundance of choice and in part algorithmic 
determinants of exposure, the gap between those exposed to news and those 
who are not is at least as pertinent, especially when looking at populism, where 
non-news exposure might amplify the effects of populist messages.
•• Do not look at the effects of populist communication in isolation. Consider the 
individual and contextual conditions that render some individuals more suscep-
tible to populist messages than others. Be it individual partisan lenses, degree 
of political sophistication, prior held attitudes toward liberal democracy, or con-
texts of system and information differences. Look at effects that are direct and 
indirect, intended and unintended, fleeting and lasting, altering or stabilizing, 
conditional or across the board, as prescribed by Potter (2007) in his general 
framework on media effects. Particular attention should be devoted to “dosage 
effects” trying to disentangle the impact of a (algorithmically) personalized diet 
of information that might be repetitive and reinforcing.
•• Do not only look at the effects of news and information. A sizable part of the 
citizenry may not consume high degrees of news (e.g., Bos et al. 2016), some 
will gravitate toward attitudinally congenial news, but others might have a pref-
erence for other formats or genres all together (Prior 2007). It would seem rel-
evant to expand the scope to, for example, the role of satire and political 
entertainment more broadly. There is some evidence to suggest that satirical 
formats can exacerbate confirmation biases, such that satirical information 
options lead to less counter-attitudinal exposure (compared with hard news), 
thus potentially reinforcing opinions and leading to further polarization (Stroud 
and Muddiman 2013). How such processes affect selection and effects vis-à-vis 
populism remain an open question.
As populism, for better and worse, is thriving (with an increase on both the political 
supply and demand side), research on populism is also likely to thrive. We hope with 
this Special Issue to reinforce the need for a communication perspective on populism. 
Populist communication is “wrapping that matters,” and while the mother ideologies 
and political ideas that different actors use to pair up with populist communication are 
truly important, the communication aspect is not only ubiquitous but also the way in 
which we can develop a language to talk about populism across its different configura-
tions and across the different key actors. Thereby, we hope to have clarified what popu-
lism is from a communications perspective so that if any scholar would read this fifty 
years from now, we would be able to conclude that there is no doubt about the impor-
tance of populism and that, now, we have greater clarity on what it is. Finally, we hope 
to push our research agendas and design toward a more interactive, systematic, and in 
particular comparative approach to the study of populist political communication.
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